Ensuring the usefulness of electronic data sources while providing necessary privacy guarantees is an important unsolved problem. This problem drives the need for an overarching analytical framework that can quantify the safety of personally identifiable information (privacy) while still providing a quantifable benefit (utility) to multiple legitimate information consumers. State of the art approaches have predominantly focused on privacy. This paper presents the first information-theoretic approach that promises an analytical model guaranteeing tight bounds on how much utility is possible for a given level of privacy and vice-versa.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information technology and electronic communications have been rapidly applied to almost every sphere of human activity, including commerce, medicine and social networking. The concomitant emergence of myriad large centralized searchable data repositories has made "leakage" of private information such as medical data, credit card information, or social security numbers via data correlation (inadvertently or by malicious design) an important and urgent societal problem [1] - [4] . Any significant contribution to protect the privacy of individuals would be of immediate relevance and in the future impact other important social processes such as health-care. Furthermore, the possibility of application to a diverse set of socially-important applications such as census data dissemination, social networks, etc., places more importance on getting the privacy model right.
The need for an appropriate privacy model was highlighted recently in the Netflix competition [5] . In 2006, the movie rental company Netflix issued a public competition with a million dollar top prize to improve its movie recommendation software using collaborative filtering. They offered a public training data set containing the movie preferences of 480,000 customers, stripped of specific personal details such as name, phone, and e-mail to protect the identities of its customers. By erasing these fields alone in the training data set, Netflix claimed that the data had been de-identified, i.e. sanitized to render impossible the identification of individual customers whose records were contained in the data set. Narayanan and Shmatikov [6] , by comparing the movie preferences of some anonymous Netflix customers with personal profiles on a public movie review portal imdb.com, easily re-identified some of these individuals using the fact that these individuals had posted some distinguishing information online. They analyzed users public postings and connected that to their Netflix preferences including how a person may have rated films with controversial themes, something that those persons might not want to reveal publicly. However, Netflix claimed that the "anonymity of the study data was comparable to the strictest federal standards for anonymizing personal health information". In similar developments in the electronic healthcare realm, clinical information for services like patient scheduling, sample tracking, and billing at hospitals and clinics are repackaged and resold to insurance groups, clinical researchers and pharmaceutical companies after a de-identification process similar to the one employed by Netflix [5] .
Presently the risk of inadvertent disclosure in web-based technologies such as search engines and web crawlers is mitigated to a large extent by the enormous utility provided by these technologies, so much so that the typical choice is to use the technology and take the risk of disclosure. But this decision is made largely in ignorance, without a knowledge of the measure of risk taken or the level of utility being extracted as a result. [7] explains how users on the Internet may be losing their privacy over time without realizing it. Whether such decisions can be informed by a formal measure of the tradeoff between the risk and benefit is thus an important question for privacy research. The legitimate information flow typically also results in leakage of private information via inference or correlation. Correlation can be either internal (within the data) or with an external source (auxiliary information). Further complicating matters, we note that private data can be application-specific, e.g. the date of birth field can be a private field in medical databases but not in motor vehicle registries. This in turn leads to the important problem of access to auxiliary (side) information -the Internet enables us to combine diverse data sources in ways that were deemed impossible before.
"Privacy" is sometimes conflated with other related but distinct problems with different solutions. The well-studied secrecy problem is one of keeping information private from an adversary who is not a legitimate participant and hence does not need to be given any access to the private information [8] - [13] .
The private information retrieval problem [14] is one of confidential searching, i.e. the issue is the privacy of the querier of a database than the privacy of the information in the database. In the secure multi-party computation problem [15] the different participants in a communication protocol want to jointly compute a function on multiple inputs in a way that does not reveal one party's inputs to the others. In all the above problems, the protocols or primitives make a sharp distinction between secret and non-secret data, what is to be shared and what is not, whereas in the privacy problem, disclosing data provides informational utility while enabling possible loss of privacy at the same time. In the course of a legitimate transaction, an authorized user can learn some public information, which is allowed and needs to be supported. At the same time he may also learn other additional information, which needs to be prevented. Thus every user is (potentially) also an adversary, a setting that makes the privacy problem distinct from all the other problems mentioned above.
Because of the strong interaction between legitimate information transfer and inadvertent information leakage, any solution to the privacy problem must also consider the potential effects on the legitimate part of the transfer, namely, the utility. It has been noted that utility and privacy are competing goals [16] . Any interaction with a data source has the potential to leak information that the source wishes to keep private, and strict privacy may be achievable only by restricting or stopping the flow of legitimate information. Indeed, perfect privacy can be achieved by publishing nothing at all, but this has no utility; perfect utility can be obtained by publishing the data exactly as received, but this offers no privacy [17] .
Utility of a data source is potentially (but not necessarily) degraded when it is restricted or modified to uphold privacy requirements. Thus, an approach that considers only one of the two aspects and not the other is bound to give a limited view of the problem and its solution space. This drives the need for a unified analytical framework that can tell us unequivocally and precisely how safe private data can be (privacy) while still providing useful benefit (utility) to multiple legitimate information consumers. The problem of privacy and information leakage has been studied for a few decades by multiple research communities (e.g., [18] - [24] ) but a precise quantification of the utility-privacy tradeoff for any database essentially remains open. Furthermore, while useful statistical models and privacy-preserving solutions have been proposed for specific applications by different communities, a general model and application- February 21, 2011 DRAFT independent metrics also remain open. The problem of a universal and analytical characterization that provides a tight privacy-utility tradeoff using tools and techniques from information theory is the main focus of this work. The central contribution of this work is a precise quantification of the tradeoff between the privacy needs of the respondents (individuals represented by the data) and the utility of the sanitized (published) data for any data source.
Rate distortion theory is a natural choice to study the utility-privacy tradeoff; utility can be quantified via fidelity which, in turn, is related to distortion, and privacy can be quantified via equivocation. Our key insight is captured in the following theorem which is presented in this paper: for a data source with private and public data, minimizing the information disclosure rate sufficiently to satisfy the desired utility for the public data is equivalent to maximizing the privacy for the private data. In a sparsely referenced paper [25] from three decades ago, Yamamoto developed the tradeoff between rate, distortion, and equivocation for a specific and simple source model. In this paper, we show via the above summarized theorem that
Yamamoto's formalism can be translated into the language of data disclosure. Furthermore, we develop a framework that allows us to model data sources (specifically databases), develop application independent utility and privacy metrics, quantify the fundamental bounds on the utility-privacy tradeoffs, and develop a side-information model for dealing with questions of external knowledge. Our main contributions are summarized below:
• We present a universal analytical framework to study the utility-privacy tradeoff, irrespective of the type of data source (application) or the method of privacy protection. The key ingredients of our proposed framework include an abstract model for arbitrary data sources, application-independent utility and privacy metrics, and a mapping between utility-privacy and rate-distortion-equivocation tradeoff regions for any data source.
• A primary challenge is to model the fact that privacy breaches can result from the existence of external data sources (i.e. other than the one being sanitized) [21] , [24] . We observe that such external knowledge can be naturally modeled in information theory using a side-information model and develop the utility-privacy tradeoff region for this model.
• Real-world data sources are in general interactive, that is, they allow users multiple interactions (queries). However, modeling this analytically is particularly challenging. Our proposed framework can already handle the non-interactive (one-shot/single query) case for any given utility and privacy requirements. We model the interactive case using a novel successive disclosure problem motivated by the information-theoretic successive refinement problem. February 
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we provide a brief background on the database privacy problem and highlight the difference between privacy and secrecy of data sources. In Section III, we present an abstract model and metrics for structured data sources such as databases. We develop our primary analytical framework in Section IV. In Section V we develop the successive disclosure problem.
We illustrate our results in Section VI and present our conclusions in Section VII.
II. THE DATABASE PRIVACY PROBLEM

A. Problem Definition
While the problem of quantifying the utility/privacy tradeoff applies to all types of data sources, we start our study with databases because they are highly structured and historically better studied than other types of sources. A database is a table (matrix) whose rows represent individual entries and whose columns represent the attributes of each entry [18] . For example, the attributes of each entry in a healthcare database typically include name, address, social security number (SSN), gender, and a collection of medical information, and each entry contains the information pertaining to an individual.
Messages from a user to a database are called queries and, in general, result in some numerical or other information from the database termed the response. Depending on the query-response model, databases can be classified as either interactive (i.e. whether the user can issue more queries after seeing earlier responses) or non-interactive (single query response) [24] .
The value, henceforth referred to as the utility, of a database is in allowing the users of the database access to specific information that is deemed public. In general, not all information stored in a database should be accessible to all users. For example, the U.S. census data contains a wealth of statistical data about the current U.S. population; however, it is imperative that individual information that contributes to the statistics be kept private from any user of the public census database. As a different example, a database maintained by a hospital will typically contain patient and diagnostic information that can serve both statistical and medical purposes; however, privacy policies will require that both researchers and physicians have access only to relevant limited data [18] .
The goal of privacy protection is to ensure that, to the extent possible, the user's knowledge is not increased beyond strict predefined limits by interacting with the database. The challenge for privacy protection is to design databases such that responses do not reveal information contravening the privacy policy.
B. Privacy vs. Secrecy
It is important to contrast the privacy problem from the well-studied (cryptographic and informationtheoretic) secrecy problem in which the task is to stop specific information from being received by untrusted third parties (eavesdroppers, wire-tappers, and other kinds of adversaries). As noted above, in the private information retrieval model [14] , the privacy problem is inverted in that the adversary is the database from whom the user wants to keep his query secret. As also noted previously, in the secure multi-party computation model [15] , each player wishes to keep his entire input secret from the other parties while jointly computing a function of all the inputs. In all these problems, a specific data item is clearly either secret or public, whereas in the privacy problem, the same data while providing informational utility to the user can also reveal private information about the individuals represented by the data. This eliminates the possibility of using secrecy techniques such as a specific model of the adversary or of harnessing any computing [8] or physical advantages such as secret keys (e.g., [26] , [27] ), channel differences (e.g., [11] - [13] ), or side information (e.g., [28] , [29] ).
For the disclosure control problem, as the database privacy problem is often referred to in the literature, privacy guarantees apply to (almost) all users making it difficult to harness any computing or physical channel differences that distinguish different users as is often the case in cryptographic or Shannontheoretic security problems. An additional challenge is that side information (referred to as auxiliary information in the database literature) from other databases (in general from sources external to the database of interest) in conjunction with one or more queries can also result in privacy breaches.
C. Privacy vs. Utility
While the privacy problem has been studied by multiple communities using multiple approaches, the companion utility problem has not been studied as analytically and exhaustively except in the context of specific applications [30] - [32] . Indeed, most discussions of privacy assume an implicit utility that is left unstated or unmeasured. Utility of a data source is, by necessity, a relative concept and is measured from the point of view of the user: utility is maximal when the user gets full information flow and reduces when the flow of certain information is reduced either by restriction or by the addition of noise. For example [33] defines utility for a privacy-enhanced statistical database (which outputs a single number, for simplicity)
as being proportional to the difference between the numerical responses of the original database and those of the perturbed database. The general concept of utility as a measure of the approximation to an underlying (but undisclosed) quantity is a fertile area of research [30] , [31] , [34] , [35] . However, these measures have not been customized for the context of privacy enhancement. Heuristic measures of utility in the context of privacy, such as bounds on the variance of noisy responses or bounds on the diameter of cluster embeddings in high-dimensional spaces, have been proposed in [17] , [30] , and [31] ; however they do not yield a general notion of utility. In the sequel, we will use a working definition of utility as a measure of the distance or divergence (using suitably chosen metrics such as Euclidean distance or Kullback-Leibler divergence) between the original and sanitized (privacy-enhanced) databases.
D. Current Approaches and Metrics
As noted above, the problem of privacy in databases has a long and rich history dating back at least to the 1970s, and space restrictions preclude any attempt to do full justice to the different approaches that have been considered along the way. While there have been many heuristic approaches to privacy, here we present only the major milestones in creating quantitative privacy metrics. Since privacy is a requirement that appears in many diverse contexts, developing a robust and formal notion of privacy that satisifies most, if not all, requirements is a tricky proposition and there have been many attempts at such a definition. The reader is referred to the detailed survey by Dwork [16] for a detailed history of the field. The problem of privacy was first exposed by census statisticians who were required to publish statistics related to census functions but without revealing any particulars of individuals in the census databases. A seminal paper by Dalenius [19] reveals the depth to which this problem was considered.
Several early attempts were made to publish census data using ad hoc techniques such as sub-sampling.
However, the first widely reported attempt at a formal definition of privacy was by Sweeney [21] . The concept of k-anonymity proposed by Sweeney captures the intuitive notion of privacy that every individual entry should be indistinguishable from (k − 1) other entries for some large value of k. More recently, researchers in the data mining community have proposed to quantify the privacy loss resulting from data disclosure as the mutual information between attribute values in the original and perturbed data sets, both modeled as random variables [23] .
The approaches considered in the literature have centered on the correct application of perturbation (also called sanitization), which encompasses a general class of database modification techniques that ensure that a user interacts only with a modified database that is derived from the original (e.g.: [17] , [19] , [21] , [23] ). Most of these perturbation approaches, with the exception of differential privacy-based ones, are heuristic and application-specific and often focus on additive noise approaches. Perturbation techniques also depend on whether the database is considered interactive or non-interactive [24] . In the non-interactive model, the database is published after a sanitization process in which personal identifiers are eliminated and the data is perturbed using one of many possible input perturbation approaches;
alternately in the interactive model, the database adds noise to the response based on a data model.
Differential privacy:
More recently, privacy approaches for statistical databases have been driven by the ǫ-differential privacy definition [24] , [36] - [38] where ǫ is a parameter that determines the privacy threshold (smaller ǫ implies tighter privacy guarantees). In these works, the authors take the view that privacy of an individual in a database is related to the ability of an adversary to detect whether that individual's data is in that database or not. Motivated by cryptographic models, they formalize this intuition by defining the difference in the adversary's outputs when presented with two databases that are identical except in one row. The authors make two strong cases for their definition: first, that the definition is independent of the distribution from which a database may be sampled, and the second, that the definition guarantees that the presence or absence of an individual row in the database makes very little difference to the output of the adversary as required, and thus, provides a precise privacy guarantee (in terms of ǫ) to any individual in the database.
More recently, Dwork et al. [38] also provide a mechanism for achieving ǫ-differential privacy universally for statistical queries f that map subsets of database entries to real numbers. Their mechanism choice is the addition of independently generated Laplacian noise to the database outputs with the variance of the noise chosen in proportion to ǫ and the maximal absolute difference ∆f between the outputs (for statistical queries f ) of two databases that differ in exactly one row. This is the most significant milestone in the theory of privacy because it provides a method to guarantee a strong but quantifiable notion of privacy for statistical databases independent of their content. Furthermore, the noise distribution can be chosen after seeing the query, so that the noise level can be adjusted adaptively when presented with a sequence of queries. However, one constraint in using the Laplacian noise mechanism is that quantifying ǫ precisely can be challenging when ∆f may be difficult to estimate -a loose bound on ∆f may result in an overly large ǫ, thereby resulting in a possible degradation of utility.
To date, privacy has been the main focus of most work in this area. Indeed, Dwork [24] states explicitly that privacy is paramount in her work. However, databases exist to be useful, and implementing sanitization techniques may hurt the usefulness of the database while safeguarding privacy. In much of the earlier work on database privacy, the utility is implicit. For example, Sweeney assumes that the databases can be k-anonymized and still maintain usefulness. However, without a relationship between k and some formal notion of usefulness, it is impossible to say what a reasonable value of k should be in practice. Similarly, utility in privacy-preserving techniques such as clustering [17] and histograms [39] is assumed to be guaranteed as a direct result of the methods used; for example, in [39] it is shown that approximation algorithms that can run on original histograms can also run on the sanitized histograms with a degradation of performance. Clustering, a common sanitization technique [17] , [40] , [41] , is claimed to maintain utility as a result of the following property: all points in a cluster are mapped to the cluster center, so no point is moved more than the diameter of the largest cluster.
As suggested by [38] , differential privacy models can use additive noise for sanitization which in turn suggests a utility metric related to the accuracy of the sanitized database. For additive Laplacian noise, the authors in [38] have shown that the privacy parameter ǫ is inversely related to the variance of the added noise; a better privacy guarantee requires a smaller ǫ which in turn implies higher variance. The accuracy of a sanitized database as a whole is inversely related to the privacy requirement. Determining the appropriate range of ǫ so that both privacy and accuracy requirements are balanced requires knowledge of the specific application. As an example, in the case of learning, recent results [42] in the area of private learning bound the extent to which the performance (i.e. accuracy) of certain kinds of classifers degrade when the training data is sanitized using the Laplacian noise mechanism proposed in [38] . In such cases, it is possible to have both, differential privacy with a known ǫ, as well as quantified utility loss for the application under consideration.
III. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS: MODEL AND METRICS
A. Model for Databases
A database D is a matrix whose rows and columns represent the individual entries and their attributes, respectively. For example, as noted above, the attributes of a healthcare database include name, address, SSN, gender, and a collection of possible medical information. The attributes that directly give away information such as name and SSN are typically considered private data while a variety of attributes such as gender, zip code, date of birth, to name a few, are considered quasi-identifiers (a term coined by Dalenius in his seminal paper on privacy in census data [19] ).
Circumventing the semantic issue:
In general, utility and privacy metrics tend to be application specific.
Focusing our efforts on developing an analytical model, we propose to capture a canonical database model and representative abstract metrics. Such a model will circumvent the classical privacy issues related to the semantics of the data by assuming that there exist forward and reverse maps of the data set to the February 21, 2011 DRAFT proposed abstract format (for example, a string of bits or a sequence of real values). Such mappings are often implicitly assumed in the privacy literature [17] , [23] , [24] ; our motivation for making it explicit is to separate the semantic issues from the abstraction in order to apply Shannon-theoretic techniques.
Model: Our proposed model focuses on large databases with K attributes per entry. Let X k , for all k ∈ K = {1, 2, , . . . , K}, and Z be finite sets. Let X k ∈ X k be a random variable denoting the k th attribute, k = 1, 2, . . . , K, and let X K ≡ (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X K ). A database d with n rows is a sequence of n independent observations from the distribution having a probability mass function
which is assumed to be known to both the designers and users of the database. Our simplifying assumption of row independence holds generally (but not always) as correlation typically arises across attributes and not across entries. We write X n K = (X n 1 , X n 2 , . . . , X n K ) to denote the n independent observations of X n K . This database model is universal in the sense that most practical databases can be mapped to this model.
The joint distribution in (1) models the fact that the attributes corresponding to an individual entry are correlated in general and consquently can reveal information about one another. In addition to the revealed information, a user of a database can have access to correlated side information from other information sources. We model the side-information as an n-length sequence Z n = (Z 1 , Z 2 , . . . , Z n ), Z i ∈ Z for all i, which is correlated with the database entries via a joint distribution p XKZ (x K ,z).
Public and private variables:
We consider a general model in which some attributes need to be kept private while the source can reveal a function of some or all of the attributes. We write K r and K h to denote sets of private (subscript h for hidden) and public (subscript r for revealed) attributes, respectively, such that K r ∪ K h = K ≡ {1, 2, . . . , K}. We further denote the corresponding collections of public and private attributes by X Kr ≡ {X k } k∈Kr and X Kh ≡ {X k } k∈Kh , respectively. More generally, we write Our notation allows for an attribute to be both public and private; this is to account for the fact that a database may need to reveal a function of an attribute while keeping the attribute itself private. In general, a database can choose to keep public (or private) one or more attributes (K > 1). Irrespective of the number of private attributes, a non-zero utility results only when the database reveals an appropriate function of some or all of its attributes.
Special cases: For K = 1, the lone attribute of each entry (row) is both public and private, and thus, we have X ≡ X r ≡ X h . Such a model is appropriate for data mining [23] ; for a more general case in which K h = K r = K, we obtain a model for census [17] , [19] data sets in which utility generally is achieved by revealing a function of every entry of the database while simultaneously ensuring that no entry is perfectly revealed. For K = 2 and K h ∪ K r = K and K h ∩ K r = ∅, we obtain the Yamamoto model in [25] .
B. Metrics: The Privacy and Utility Principle
Even though utility and privacy measures tend to be specific to the application, there is a fundamental principle that unifies all these measures in the abstract domain. The aim of a privacy-preserving database is to provide some measure of utility to the user while at the same time guaranteeing a measure of privacy for the entries in the database.
A user perceives the utility of a perturbed database to be high as long as the response is similar to the response of the unperturbed database; thus, the utility is highest of an unperturbed database and goes to zero when the perturbed database is completely unrelated to the original database. Accordingly, our utility metric is an appropriately chosen average 'distance' function between the original and the perturbed databases.
Privacy, on the other hand, is maximized when the perturbed response is completely independent of the data. Our privacy metric measures the difficulty of extracting any private information from the response, i.e., the amount of uncertainty or equivocation about the private attributes given the response.
C. A Utility-Privacy Tradeoff Model
We now develop a utility-privacy tradeoff model for databases. A primary motivation for our approach is the observation that database sanitization is traditionally the process of distorting the data to achieve some measure of privacy. For our abstract universal database model, sanitization is thus a problem of mapping a set of database entries to a different set subject to specific utility and privacy requirements.
Mapping: Our notation below relies on this abstraction. Let X k , k ∈ K, and Z, be as above and let X j be additional finite sets for all j ∈ K r . Recall that a database d with n rows is an instantiation of X n K . Thus, we will henceforth refer to a real database d as an input sequence and to the corresponding sanitized database (SDB) d s as an output sequence. When the user has access to side information, the reconstructed sequence d ′ at the user will in general be different from the output sequence.
Our coding scheme consists of an encoder F E which is a mapping from the set of all input sequences (i.e., all databases d allowable by the underlying distribution) to a set of indices W ≡ {1, 2, . . . , M } and an associated table of output sequences (each of which is a d s ) with a one-to-one mapping to the set of indices given by
where K r ⊆ K enc ⊆ K and M = 2 nR is the number of output (sanitized) sequences created from the set of all input sequences. The encoding rate R is the number of bits per row (without loss of generality, we assume n rows in both d and d ′ ) of the sanitized database. The encoding F E in (2) includes both public and private attributes in order to model the general case in which the sanitization depends on a subset of all attributes.
A user with a view of the SDB (i.e., an index w ∈ W for every d) and with access to side information Z n , whose entries Z i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n, take values in the alphabet Z, reconstructs the database d ′ via the mapping
such thatX n Kr = F D F E X n Kenc , Z n . Utility: A database may need to satisfy utility constraints for any subset S (l) r ⊆ K r of attributes, l = 1, 2, . . . , 2 |Kr| − 1, and thus, we consider a general framework with 1 ≤ L u ≤ 2 |Kr| − 1 utility functions that need to be satisfied, where |K r | is the cardinality of K r . Relying on the distance based utility principle, we model the l th utility, u l , l = 1, 2, . . . , L u , via the requirement that the average distortion of the revealed variables is upper bounded, for some ǫ > 0, as
where ρ (·, ·) denotes a distortion function, E is the expectation over the joint distribution of (X Sr ,X Sr ),
, respectively. Examples of distance-based distortion functions include the Euclidean distance for Gaussian distributed database entries, the Hamming distance for binary input and output sequences, and the Kullback-Leibler (K-L)
'distance' comparing input and output distributions.
Privacy: Having argued that a quantifiable uncertainty captures the underlying privacy principle of a database, we model the (collective) uncertainty or equivocation p of all the private variables using the conditional entropy as
i.e., we require the average number of uncertain bits per entry to be lower bounded by E. The case in which side information is not available at the user is obtained by simply setting Z n = ∅ in (3) and (5). More generally, we can impose privacy constraints on all possible subsets of private variables S
Continuous alphabet: In general, some or all attributes may be assumed to be continuous variables;
examples include numerical attributes such as height and weight which are typically assumed to be normally distributed. In the sequel, we present results for databases with discrete alphabets; however, we illustrate our results for both discrete and continuous alphabets. The model, encoding, and distortion functions for the continuous alphabet can be defined analogously to the discrete case described here.
However, for continuous variables since differential entropy can be negative, we define a non-negative quantity, privacy leakage P L , as follows.
Definition 1:
For databases in which some or all attributes are continuous variables, the (collective) privacy leakage P L is given by
Remark 2: Privacy leakage captures the average number of bits leaked about the hidden variables via the revealed variables and the side information, and thus, is upper bounded as
Remark 3: The privacy constraints in (5) and (7) are complementary. This is because, in constrast with privacy defined in (5) as a measure of the average information hidden from the user of the database, privacy leakage in (7) is a measure of the average information revealed about the hidden variables via the revealed variables. Thus, for a fixed set of hidden variables, as privacy increases, privacy leakage decreases and vice-versa. One can generalize (7) to constrain the privacy leakage for every non-empty subset of K h .
The utility and privacy metrics in (4) and (5) capture two aspects of our universal model: a) both represent averages by computing the metrics across all database instantiations d, and b) the metrics bound the average distortion and privacy per entry. Since the likelihood of non-typical sequences decreases exponentially with increasing n (very large databases), these guarantees apply uniformly to almost all large (typical) databases. Our general model also encompasses the fact that the exact mapping from the distortion and equivocation domains to the utility and privacy domains, respectively, can depend on the application.
IV. UTILITY-PRIVACY TRADEOFFS
A. Equivalence of Utility-Privacy and Rate-Distortion-Equivocation
We now present our approach to quantifying the utility-privacy tradeoff regions for databases. A key contribution is demonstrating the equivalence between the database privacy problem and a source coding problem with additional privacy constraints.
Without loss of generality, we assume that D takes values in a closed compact set, i.e., the maximal distortion D i , for all i, is bounded. Furthermore, from Remark 1, we know that
is also bounded. Based on our notation thus far, we define the utility-privacy tradeoff region as follows.
Definition 2:
The utility-privacy tradeoff region T is the set of all feasible utility-privacy tuples (D, E)
for which there exists a coding scheme (F E , F D ) given by (2) and (3), respectively, with parameters (n, M, u, p) satisfying the constraints in (4) and (6) . For a distortion tuple D, the tuple Γ U P (D) denotes the privacy tuple on the boundary of T .
Taking into account that the distortion D takes values in a closed compact set, the equivocation metrics in (6) are bounded, and combinations of (D, E) tuples are also feasible, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1:
The utility-privacy tradeoff region T is a closed convex set.
For the database source model described here, a classical lossy source coding problem is defined as follows.
Definition 3:
The set of tuples (R, D) is said to be feasible (achievable) if there exists a coding scheme given by (2) and (3) with parameters (n, M, ∆) satisfying the constraints in (4) and a rate constraint
When additional privacy constraints in (6) are included, the source coding problem becomes one of determining the achievable rate-distortion-equivocation region defined as follows.
Definition 4:
The rate-distortion-equivocation region R * RDE is the set of all tuples (R, D, E) for which there exists a coding scheme given by (2) and (3) with parameters (n, M, u, p) satisfying the constraints in (4), (6) , and (9). We define the set of all feasible distortion-equivocation tuples (D, E) and E = E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E Lp as follows:
Thus, a rate-distortion-equivocation code is by definition a (lossy) source code satisfying a set of distortion constraints that achieves a specific privacy level for every choice of the distortion tuple. In the following theorem, we present a fundamental result capturing the precise relationship between T and
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analytical result that quantifies a tight relationship between utility and privacy. We briefly sketch the proof here; a detailed proof can found in the appendix. Theorem 1: For a database with a set of utility and privacy metrics, the utility-privacy tradeoff region T is the distortion-equivocation region R * D−E . Sketch of Proof : The crux of our argument is the fact that for any feasible utility vector D, choosing the minimum rate R * (D, E), ensures that the least amount of information is revealed about the source via the reconstructed variables. This in turn ensures that the maximal privacy of any subset of private attributes is achieved for that utility since, in general, the public and private variables are correlated. For the same set of utility constraints, since such a rate requirement is not a part of the utility-privacy model, the resulting maximal privacy achieved is at most as large as that in R * D−E (see Fig. 1(a) ). Implicit in this argument is the fact that a utility-privacy achieving code does not perform any better than a rate-distortion-equivocation code in terms of achieving a lower rate (given by log 2 M/n) for the same distortion and privacy constraints. If such a code exists then we can find an equivalent source coding problem (by ignoring the privacy constraints) for which the code would violate Shannon's source coding theorem [43] .
Remark 5:
An immediate consequence of Theorem 1 is that a distortion-constrained source code suffices to preserve a desired level of privacy; in other words, the utility constraints require revealing data which in turn comes at a certain privacy cost that must be borne and vice-versa. We capture this observation in Fig. 1(b) , where we contrast existing privacy-exclusive and utility-exclusive regimes (extreme points of the utility-privacy tradeoff curve) with our more general approach of determining the set of feasible utility-privacy tradeoff points.
From an information-theoretic perspective, the power of Theorem 1 is that it allows us to study the larger problem of database utility-privacy tradeoffs in terms of a relatively familiar problem of source coding with privacy constraints. As noted previously, this problem has been studied for a specific source model by Yamamoto [25] and here we expand his analysis to arbitrary database models including those with side information at the user. Rate for the database can be interpreted as the number of revealed information bits (precision) per row (entry). Our result shows the tight relationship between utility, privacy, and precision -fixing the value of any one determines the other two; for example, fixing the utility (distortion D) precisely quantifies the maximal privacy Γ * (D) and the minimal precision R * (D, E)
for any E bounded by Γ * (D).
B. A General U-P Tradeoff Region
In [25] , Yamamoto developed the rate-distortion-equivocation region for a source with a public variable X r and a private variable X h subject to the utility and privacy constraints in (4) and (5), respectively.
In the following theorem, we generalize Yamamoto's result [25] to the case of a source (here database) with multiple public and private attributes and multiple utility and privacy constraints. The proof is very similar to that developed in [25, Appendix] and is briefly sketched in the appendix. Recall that D and E denote the distortion and equivocation tuples, respectively, and are the design parameters of the system.
Definition 5:
For a database with K attributes X n K = X n Kr , X n Kh generated from a distribution p XK , the functions Γ(D) = (Γ m (D)) Lp m=1 and R (D, E) and the regions R D−E and R are defined as
where P (D, E) is the set of all p (x Kr , x Kh ) p (x Kr |x Kr , x Kh ) such that (4) and (6) are satisfied, while Theorem 2: For a database with K attributes X K = (X Kr , X Kh )
Remark 6: For X Kh ≡ X h and X Kr ≡ X r we recover Yamamoto's result in [25, Theorem 3] .
Remark 7:
For X Kh ≡ X h ≡ X Kr ≡ X r ≡ X, i.e., K = 1, we obtain the abstraction and RDE region for a data-mining data set.
Remark 8: For K r = K h = K, we obtain the abstraction and RDE region for a census data set.
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C. Capturing the Effects of Side-Information
It has been illustrated that when a user has access to an external data source (which is not part of the database under consideration) the level of privacy that can be guaranteed changes [21] , [24] . We cast this problem in information-theoretic terms as a side information problem.
We focus on the case with side information at the user and knowledge of its statistics at the encoder, i.e., at the database. For ease of presentation, we assume all variables X K are used in encoding; the more general case of a subset of public and private attributes is obtained by simply replacing K by K enc .
Furthermore, without loss of generality, we assume a single utility constraint on all revealed variables (distortion), i.e., choosing L u = 1 with S is the minimal information rate (see Fig. 1(a) ) for very large databases (n → ∞). The proof is similar to the proof for Theorem 2 and is sketched briefly in the appendix.
Definition 6: For a database with K attributes X n K = X n Kr , X n Kh generated from a distribution p XK , and side-information Z n available only at the receiver, the functions Γ W ZP (D) and R W ZP (D, E) and the regions R W ZP D−E and R W ZP are defined as
where
and the function g : X K × Z →X Kr such thatX Kr = f (X K , Z) .
Remark 9:
The auxiliary variable U can be restricted to an alphabet size |U | ≤ |X K | + 1 [44, Proof of Theorem A2 on p. 9].
Theorem 3: For a database with side information available only at the user,
While Theorem 3 applies to a variety of database models, it is extremely useful in quantifying the utility-privacy tradeoff for the following special cases of interest.
Remark 10: The single database problem (i.e., no side information): SDB is revealed. Here, we have Z = 0 and U =X r , i.e., the reconstructed vectors seen by the user are the same as the SDB vectors.
Remark 11: Completely hidden private variables: Privacy is completely a function of the statistical
relationship between public, private, and side information data. The expression for R(D, E) in (25) assumes the most general model of encoding some private and all the public attributes. When the private attributes can only be deduced from the revealed attributes, i.e., the private attributes are not involved in encoding, the relationship between the private, private, and revealed attributes is captured by the Markov chain X Kh − X Kr − U . The resulting maximal equivocation of the hidden attributes is a function of both the correlation between the hidden and revealed attributes and the distortion constraint D.
V. A SUCCESSIVE DISCLOSURE PROBLEM
As mentioned earlier, databases can be broadly categorized as non-interactive and interactive depending on whether the data is sanitized once before publishing or repeatedly in response to each query, respectively. For census and similar statistical databases a one-shot sanitization is typical whereas for more interactive databases multiple queries can lead to multiple sanitizations. In this section, we develop this problem in the context of our information-theoretic model.
Single-query model:
The model and analysis proposed earlier in this section captures the non-interactive database model and the resulting utility-privacy tradeoff region. For this one-shot model, sanitization is determined by the choice of the utility and privacy metrics defined a priori. In contrast to existing approaches that are dominantly focused on additive noise perturbations satisfying a large set of queries [38] , [45] , our one-shot approach is independent of queries and is designed to satisfy specific utility and privacy constraints. Such a model is relevant for databases such as those with medical and clinical data that may find repeated uses in the future but with queries that cannot be predicted ahead of time or that require query-independent strict sanitization prior to interaction to ensure regulatory compliance, such as for example, U.S. Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy policies [46] .
Multiple-query model:
For a large majority of data repositories, utility is a function of their usage and as such the problem of addressing the utility-privacy tradeoffs in a multiple query model is imperative.
A side-effect of allowing multiple queries is that a user can refine her query to learn more information at each step, which in turn can lead to privacy breaches. Our aim is to determine whether a certain level of overall utility can be guaranteed while preserving a desired overall privacy threshold. In the absence of disclosure controls, a database will typically respond to each query independently of the previous queries.
We seek to develop a model in which the database is cognizant of current and past queries in responding to future queries. To this end, we assume the existence of a data collector that provides an interface for the user to submit queries and collate the responses over multiple queries, a common assumption in the multi-query literature [24] , [37] , [38] . For this model, under the assumption that the user wishes to obtain a refined view of the source, we propose to determine whether a source can be successively disclosed,
i.e., whether a set of overall utility and privacy constraints can be satisfied via multiple disclosures with increasing refinement at each stage and without any information loss relative to an equivalent single-shot model with the same overall utility and privacy constraints.
This problem of successive disclosure has a natural relationship to a problem of successive refinement in information theory, which pertains to determining whether successively revealing data from a source with decreasing distortion at each stage can ensure no rate loss relative to a one-shot approach with the same final distortion [47] - [49] . We demonstrate this analogy in Fig. 2 where, at the first stage, the user obtains a specific view (denotedX
Kr (W 1 ) for a source X Kenc ) of the source which in conjunction with the second stage provides a final refined viewX (2) Kr . The minimal rate for the first stage of refinement is R (D 1 ) . The successive refinement problem is to determine whether R 2 = R (D 2 ). Analogously, the successive disclosure problem is that of first revealing the database at a high distortion level D 1 and the corresponding maximal privacy Γ(D 1 ) such that R 1 = R (D 1 , Γ (D 1 ))and then determining whether
and from the concavity of the
As with the successive refinement problem, our results can help determine the conditions and relationships between the input and output sequences under which a source can be disclosed successively.
Remark 12:
Since the maximal equivocation achievable for a given distortion D is Γ(D), it suffices to restrict our attention to this curve since we want to maximize the privacy guarantee for any choice of utility (distortion). Thus, the problem of successive disclosure is one of determining whether multiple disclosures can be achieved with no loss in rate relative to the one-shot model. Since the maximal privacy is achieved at the minimal rate (we prove this in the following theorem) for a given distortion, no rate loss implies no excess loss in privacy relative to the one-shot model.
Remark 13:
Analogously to the relationship between successive refinement and multiple description, one could generalize the successive disclosure problem to obtain a multiple disclosure problem which involves determining the rates R 0 and R 1 at which the database responds with distortion and equivocation levels (D 0 , Γ(D 0 )) and (D 1 , Γ(D 1 )) to the first and second query, respectively, such that a user using both query responses can reconstruct a response at a distortion-privacy level of (D 2 , Γ(D 2 )). Analogous to the relationship between multiple description and successive refinement, the successive disclosure problem described here is a special case of the multiple disclosure problem for which there is no rate loss, i.e.,
We now formally define the successive disclosure problem.
if there exists a sequence of encoding functions
and reconstruction functions
Kr , and
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and
where R (D, E) is the rate-distortion-equivocation function.
We now present our main result for successive disclosure of multi-query databases. Our proof hinges on the fact that the distribution achieving the minimal rate also achieves the maximal privacy and exploits the Markov condition required of a source that can be successively refined. The following theorem summarizes our result.
Theorem 4:
A database (X Kr , X Kh ) generated by a distribution p XK can be successively disclosed Proof: (Necessity)-Suppose a source is not successively refineable but is successively discloseable, i.e., starting from R (D 1 , Γ(D 1 )) no rate loss results from encoding and revealing the source a second time such that for the desired distortion D 2 , the rate over two disclosures is R(D 2 , Γ(D 2 )). Since one can always ignore the privacy requirement, this implies that the source is also successively refineable, thus contradicting our assumption.
(Sufficiency)-Assume that the source can be successively refined. This implies that the source encodes the attribute set X Kenc first at rate R(D 1 ) and refines on this to achieve a final distortion of D 2 at rate R(D 2 ), i.e., there exists a conditional distribution p x
Kh with
and X Kenc −X
Kr −X
Kr form a Markov chain, i.e.,
Kr |x Kenc = p x
Kr |x Kenc p x
Kr |x
Kr . Kr ) can be achieved (the expression follows directly from the fact that at the second stage the receiver has access to both W 1 and W 2 ). We now show that
, X Kr , i.e., only a subset of the hidden attributes are used in encoding, and the remaining subset of hidden variables are such that
Kh , i = 1, 2, form a Markov chain (see Remark 11) where K h \K ′ h is the set of all hidden attributes not in K ′ h . Since the source can be successively refined, the Markov chain relationship in (43) implies that the following Markov relationship also holds:
i.e., conditioned onX
Kr , X Kh is independent ofX
Kr . This in turn implies that Q = H(X Kh |X
Kr ) = Γ (D 2 ), thereby proving that, a source that can be successive refined can also be successive disclosed.
Remark 14:
That a rate-distortion code suffices to achieve the maximal equivocation is evident from the achievable scheme detailed in the Appendix, and we have used that fact here.
Remark 15:
For the special cases of census and data-mining data sets for which K = K r = K h , since X Kr = X Kh , the maximal equivocation and the minimal rate of encoding are directly related via (42) .
In fact, the minimal rate is the privacy leakage as defined in (7).
Remark 16: Not all sources are successively refineable [50, p. 61] ; however, frequently modeled distributions such as Gaussian with squared-distance distortion, Laplacian with absolute error, and arbitrary discrete distributions with Hamming distortion can be refined [47] .
VI. EXAMPLES
We illustrate our results for two types of databases: one, a categorical database and the other a numerical database. Categorical data are typically discrete data sets comprising information such as gender, social security numbers and zipcodes that provide (meaningful) utility only if they are mapped within their own set. On the other hand, without loss of generality numerical data can be assumed to belong to the set of real numbers. In general, a database will have a mixture of categorical and numerical attributes, but for the purpose of illustration, we assume that the database is of one type or the other, i.e., every attribute is of the same kind. In both cases, we assume a single utility (distortion) function. We discuss each example in detail below.
Example 1: Consider a categorical database with K ≥ 1 attributes. In general, the k th attribute X k takes values in a discrete set X k of cardinality M k . For our example, we model the utility as a single distortion function of all attributes, and therefore, it suffices to view each entry (a row of all K attributes) of the database as generated from a discrete scalar source X of cardinality M , i.e., X ∼ p(x), x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M }. For this arbitrary discrete source model, we assume that the output sample spaceX = X and consider the generalized Hamming distortion as the utility function such that the average distortion D is given by
Recall that R(D) denotes the rate-distortion function without privacy constraints; from the proof of Theorem 2 in the appendix, we have that a rate distortion code suffices to achieve the maximal equivocation.
Thus, the maximal equivocation is bounded as
with equality when R(D) is achievable. It has been shown by Erokhin [51] and Pinkston [52] that R(D) is achieved by upside down waterfilling such that
and the 'test channel' is given by
The maximal achievable equivocation, and hence, the largest utility-privacy tradeoff region is
Remark 17: The distortion function chosen in (45) captures the fact that for categorical data the utility (fidelity) of the revealed data is reduced if any entry is changed from its original value. The optimal upside down waterfilling solution in (46) has the effect of 'flattening' the output distribution, and thus, as in (46) the source samples with very low probabilities (relative to the waterfilling level) are ignored (thereby minimizing the information transfer rate). This in turn maximizes the privacy achieved since the outliers that are easiest to infer are eliminated. It is worth noting that eliminating outliers, referred to as information suppression or aggregation, is widely used as a privacy-preserving technique in the statistics community.
Example 2:
In this example we model a numerical database. We consider a K = 2 database where both attributes X and Y are jointly Gaussian with zero means and variances σ 2 X and σ 2 Y , respectively, and with correlation coefficient ρ = E [XY ] / (σ X σ Y ). This model applies for numerical data such as height and weight measures which are generally assumed to be normally distributed. We assume that for every entry only one of the two attributes, say X, is revealed while the other, say Y , is hidden such that Y − X −X forms a Markov chain. The rate-distortion-equivocation region for this case can be obtained directly from Yamamoto's results [25] with appropriate substitution for a jointly Gaussian source.
Furthermore, due to the Markov relationship between of X, Y, andX, the minimization of I(X;X) is strictly over p(x|x), and thus, simplifies to the familiar rate-distortion problem for a Gaussian source X which in turn is achieved by choosing the reverse channel fromX to X as an additive white Gaussian noise channel with variance D (average distortion). The maximal equivocation achieved thus is
and the corresponding privacy leakage (in bits per entry) is
Note that Γ(D) is a minimum for D = 0 (X revealed perfectly) in which case only the residual independent of X in Y can be private, and is a maximum equal to the entropy of Y at the maximum distortion D = σ 2 X . Thus, the largest utility-privacy tradeoff region is simply the region enclosed by Γ(D).
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Information privacy is an important problem that is relevant to several application areas. The ability to achieve the desired level of privacy while guaranteeing a minimal level of utilty and vice-versa for a general data source is paramount. In this paper, our work defines privacy and utility as fundamental characteristics of data sources that may be in conflict and can be traded off. Our work is one of the earliest attempt at applying information theoretic techniques to this problem. Using rate-distortion theory, we have developed a utility-privacy tradeoff region for independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) data sources with known distribution using application independent utility and privacy metrics.
The general problem of quantifying utility-privacy tradeoffs remains largely open. For example, our model needs to be generalized for non-i.i.d. data sources, sources with unknown distributions, and sources lacking strong structural properties (such as Web searching). Results from rate-distortion theory for sources with memory and universal lossy compression may help address the challenge of developing non-i.i.d. and non-distribution-specific privacy bounds. Furthermore, our "one-shot" model assumes that the database is perturbed once and for all before any queries are processed; this can be loosened to allow a more interactive "online" perturbation such as, for example, adding noise before each query. Further afield, our privacy guarantee is an average metric based on Shannon entropy which may be inadequate for some applications where anonymity guarantees are required for every individual in a database. Finally, another area of interest is to understand whether our formalism can be adapted to model privacy in social networks.
APPENDIX PROOFS
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We now prove that the largest utility-privacy tradeoff region T = R D−E . Observe that the tuples D and E parametrize both regions and have the same constraints as given by (4) and (6), respectively. However, the region R RDE of all (R, D, E) tuples from which we obtain R D−E , has an additional constraint on the rate R in (9) , and thus, we have
We now show that T ⊆ R D−E . Note that since utility (distortion) and privacy (equivocation) are not independent (revealing data reduces privacy and vice-versa), we fix one of the two parameters for both regions. Without loss of generality, we assume that the space of feasible distortion tuples is the same for both regions. Consider a distortion tuple D * such that (D * , E T ) ∈ T and (D * , E R ) ∈ R D−E . Recall from Definition 4 that
We now show that E T is such that every entry
Assume that not every entry of E T satisfies (54), i.e., there exists an
Recall that there is no explicit constraint on the rate R T (=1/n (log 2 M T ) where M T is the number of output sequences for any tuple in T ) in T , and thus, the resulting rate R T can satisfy one of the following three cases:
Consider cases 1 and 2. From Definition 4, R RDE contains the set of all feasible (R, D, E) pairs; furthermore, it quantifies precisely the lower bound on the achievable rate R for any (D, E) tuple. thus, by definition, (54) cannot be violated, and therefore, cases 1 and 2 cannot be satisfied without violating definition 4.
Consider the condition in case 3. This implies that there exists a source coding scheme in T such that for a distortion D * , we can achieve a lower coding rate than that given by R RDE . Since in both cases, the code can be used for a source coding problem without privacy constraints, such a code would directly violate Shannon's source coding theorem [43] , i.e., Case 3 cannot be satisfied for any E T that violates (54).
B. Proof of Theorem 2
The proofs for Lemmas 2 and 3 follow directly from the properties of rate-distortion and entropy functions. Our proof for Theorem 2 follows along the same lines as that in [25, Appendix] and we briefly sketch it below.
The average distortion D l , l = 1, 2, . . . , L u , constraints require that 
Letting ǫ → 0 and invoking the continuity of Γ(D), we obtain Γ * m (D) ≤ Γ m (D), for all m. The next step of the converse is to show that R * (D, E) ≥ R(D, E). Our proof mirrors that in [25, Appendix, Lemma A2] and so we briefly sketch it below. 
Let e k (i) ≡ H X Kh (i) |X Kr (i) andē (i) ≡ (e 1 (i) , e 2 (i) , . . . , e Lu (i)). From (54) we have
Combining (61), (71), (72), and Lemma 3, we have
≥ R (D + ǫ, E − ǫ) .
Letting ǫ → 0 and invoking the continuity of R(D, E), we obtain Γ * m (D) ≤ Γ m (D), for all m. Remark 18: If the hidden variables X n Kh are not directly used in encoding, i.e., X n Kh −X n Kr −X n Kr form a Markov chain, then from the i.i.d. assumption of the source and the resulting encoding, the Markov chain X Kh (i) − X Kr (i) −X Kr (i) holds for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
We now prove that R * RDE ⊇ R RDE . For D l ≥ 0, for all l = 1, 2, . . . , L u , and 0 ≤ E m ≤ Γ m (D), we assume that p(x Kr , x Kh ,x Kr ) ∈ P (D, E) achieves R(D, E). For this distribution p(x Kr |x Kenc ), the encoder sets let R = I(X Kenc ; X Kr )+ǫ, and generates 2 nR i.i.d. sequences according to n i=1 p (x Kr (i)) , and indexes them asX n Kr (w), where w ∈ 1, 2, , . . . , 2 nR . Let T A (n, ǫ) denote the set of strongly typical A sequences of length n. Upon observing X n K = X n Kr , X n Kh , the encoder searches for aX n Kr (w) such that X n Kr (w) , X n Kh (w) ,X n Kr (w) ∈ T XK r ,XK h ,XK r (n, ǫ) and reveals the resulting w andX n Kr (w) to the decoder. By construction, the distortion constraints will be satisfied.
. For a one-to-one mapping from W toX n Kr (W ), the equivocation of the m th hidden subset, m = 1, 2, . . . , L p , is given as 
6] for the Wyner-Ziv problem and we briefly sketch it below.
(108)
where (108) 
Bounding the equivocation function, we have
where (112) follows from the definition of U. Finally, using concavity properties, as with the previous proof, in the limit as n → ∞, we have
Lower bound on equivocation: Let Y n m ≡ X n Kh . For a one-to-one mapping from W to U n (W ), the equivocation is given as
The lower bound on the equivocation can now be obtained in a manner analogous to the proof in (74)
